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Abstract
The objective of this paper is to demonstrate the importance of the community 
in the legislative work in Marsilius of Padua’s Defensor pacis. Firstly, I will make 
a small biographical outline of Marsilius of Padua. Secondly, I will mention the 
importance of the community in the legislative work, but I will also defi ne the 
concept of communitas. I suggest that in Marsilius’s political system the princes 
are restrained by the legislative force of the citizen body. Finally, I will explain 
the condition in which the citizen’s liberty is protected. In my contention, for 
Marsilius liberty is the capacity of the body of citizens to participate in the 
public affairs of the city. In this way, I attempt to demonstrate the existence 
of an implicit republican preference in the Defensor pacis.
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Resumo
O objetivo deste artigo é mostrar o peso que a comunidade tem na legislação 
da cidade Defensor Pacis de Marsílio de Pádua. Neste artigo, primeiramente, 
faço um breve resumo sobre a bibliografi a de Marsílio de Pádua. Em seguida, 
trato sobre a relação entre a comunidade e a parte legislativa da civitas, mas 
não antes de defi nir o conceito communitas de Marsílio. No sistema proposto 
por Marsílio, os príncipes são limitados pela ação legislativa da comunidade, 
dando mais peso para o corpo cidadão. Finalmente, explico as condições em que 
a liberdade é protegida em uma cidade. Sugiro que a liberdade de Marsílio é a 
capacidade do corpo cidadão de participar na vida pública da cidade e por isso 
tento mostrar que há uma implícita preferência republicana no Defensor Pacis.
Palavras-chave: poder secular, liberdade, civitas, universitas civium, communitas.
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Introduction
It is indisputable that the Defensor pacis was set out to refute the doctrine 
of the papal fullness of power. The principal objective of Marsilius of Padua’s main 
work was to prove that the pope is not a legitimate source of power. Instead, 
Marsilius placed the source of all coercive power within the community. Firstly, this 
paper intends to define what the community or valentiors pars meant for Marsilius. 
Secondly, I want to demonstrate the crucial role that the valentiors pars played for 
Marsilius in the legislation and execution of power. In this sense, my intention is to 
prove that in the Defensor pacis, the community — referred to as valentiors pars 
— has a very active role in governing itself by making the city’s laws. Finally, my 
intention is to show some of the opinions written by contemporary scholars about 
Marsilius of Padua’s concept of political liberty.   
Marsilius Mainardini was born around 1275-1280 in Padua in the region known 
as the March of Treviso. Although he came from a family of prominence in the civil 
administration in Padua, he was an obscure figure until 1313 when he was elected 
rector of the University of Paris. Later on, his name achieved notoriety when he be-
came involved in the dispute over investitures in support of the Holy Roman emperor.
The first reference to Marsilius’s political ideas was his knowledge of the com-
munal life that had developed in his native Padua during the thirteenth century. Like 
other cities in northern Italy, Padua had been ruled by a republican system of govern-
ment in which the legislation imposed a potestas based on a combination of councils 
and elected officials. The second intellectual resource for Marsilius was the philosophy 
of Aristotle and the Roman law. The University of Padua has generally been credited 
with the resurrection of Roman legal tradition and grammatical studies, but Aristotle’s 
philosophy was also well known in Italy through the commentaries of Arab scholars. 
While at the University of Paris, Marsilius engaged himself further with the 
philosophy and natural sciences of Aristotle. In the academic milieu, his vision of Ar-
istotle’s science was shaped by Averroës’s commentaries. Averroës’s philosophy has 
also been associated with some of the masters at the University of Paris, including 
Marsilius’s own Jean Jardun. For this reason, scholars such as George de Lagarde saw 
in Marsilius’s Defensor pacis an example of political Averroism (de Largarde, 1953, 
p. 335). However, the most important influence on the Defensor pacis was the explo-
sive political context of the second decade of the fourteenth century. In 1324, John 
XXII had excommunicated Ludwig of Bavaria, and Ludwig had accused the pope of 
heresy and declared his papacy illegitimate. In 1324, Marsilius completed the Defen-
sor pacis in which he refuted the doctrine of papal fullness of power (Kilkulen, 2012).
The Defensor pacis was furiously condemned by ecclesiastical authority. Mar-
silius had presented a rigorous theory of political power which broke with the eccle-
siastical tradition that conceived the relations between the secular and the spiritual 
spheres as the coexistence of two equal powers (Bayona, 2009, p. 145). Moreover, 
he placed the origin of that power in a human sphere. It is Strauss’s contention 
that Marsilius did this by consistently following Aristotle’s Politics (Strauss, 1987, 
p. 277). The Defensor pacis seems like an appendix to Aristotle’s Politics, agreeing 
with almost every definition of Aristotle’s political philosophy. However, Marsilius 
considered that Aristotle was unaware of the disease afflicting civil society caused 
by the doctrine of papal plenitude of power and that “the fundamental political 
authority is not the government of the ruling part but the human legislator, and 
the human legislator is the people” (Strauss, 1987, p. 280). As a result, the Defen-
sor pacis has become an example of secularism anchored in Aristotelian principles, 
which de Lagarde considers to be one of the first manifestations of laicism (de 
Lagarde, 1953, p. 333-334).
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The Defensor pacis explained the causes by which tranquility exists and is pre-
served. The objective — to prevent and eliminate strife — was based on the premise 
that, when discord affects a community, there is uneasiness and mistrust among its 
members. When concord is missing, fighting immediately erupts and the functions 
of the city, which should work properly to sustain life, stop and prevent further co-
operation. For this reason, the principal objective of Defensor pacis was to identify 
the causes of strife in a community and tackle the discontent among its members.
Lastly, the Defensor pacis was written in support of Ludwig IV in his fight 
against John XXII in one of the most critical moments of the struggle between 
secular and ecclesiastical powers in Medieval Europe. When Marsilius identified the 
main source of strife in his times, he pinpointed the false belief that Christians were 
the subjects of two governments — one spiritual and the other secular (Bayona, 
2009, p. 143). The objective of the Defensor pacis was to prevent conflict between 
these two spheres, because only when the cause of strife — the false belief that the 
pope was the source of political power — was understood, would it be possible to 
prevent conflict and achieve peace (Brett, 2004, p. xviii).
Valentior pars, community and legislative 
action 
Marsilius considered that the commonwealth exists to ensure that human 
beings can achieve a good life when engaging in the exercise of practical virtues 
(Strauss, 1987, p. 277). In particular, Marsilius consciously followed Aristotle because 
he was aiming to expose a theory of the general character of political government, 
a theory in which the two principal bonds that maintain peace within the com-
munities are the existence and love of juridical institutions (Quillet, 2007, p. 533). 
For Marsilius, civitas and regnum refer to abstract categories and not to particular 
regimes. The aim of having a civitas is to guarantee peace because only in peace 
can individuals aspire to security and a worthy life (Bayona, 2009, p. 148). 
For Marsilius, concord appears as a result of a peaceful interaction among the 
parts which form the civitas (Costa, 1993, p. 25). When peace prevails within the 
main human groups, generally understood as the arts and professions, each section 
can perform its function without interference and can ensure the self-sufficiency 
of the city. This led Marsilius to define the perfect community as an association of 
men who interact with others to sustain certain needs by performing differentiated 
tasks (Quillet, 2007, p. 533). Thus, Marsilius also agreed with Aristotle in considering 
plurality a necessary quality for the survival of any human association.3 The com-
munity of humans for Marsilius, as Quillet points out, had a natural origin ‘made 
explicitly by agreement of the wills’ (2007, p. 533-534). Natural sociability is what 
forces humans to live together in society. When human beings started to live in 
society, they discovered new arts and began a process of specialization which led 
to the most perfect of human assemblies: the city. Marsilius remained anchored in 
Aristotle’s philosophy when he affirmed that the perfection of the city is achieved 
when every part that comprises it performs its task. When this happens, the city is 
able to achieve self-sufficiency.4 
3 ‘Hii autem hominum diversi ordines seu officia non aliud sunt quam pluralitas et distinccio parcium civitatis’ 
(Marsiglio da Padova, 1991, p. 90).
4 According to de Largarde, after the Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics became fundamental textbooks 
in the Western World, Aristotelian thinkers adopted with enthusiasm the axiom that considered men social 
animals by nature. Therefore, there was a preconceived ontological idea of society within the individual. In other 
words, there was an exigency of human nature that forced men to live in society (de Lagarde, 1967, p. 97-98).
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Now a city, according to Aristotle in Politics I, chapter 1, is: ‘a perfect community 
possessing every limit of self–suffi ciency, as it is consequent to say, having thus come 
about for the sake of living, but existing for the sake of living well’. Now in saying, 
‘having come about for the sake of living, but existing for the sake of living well’, 
Aristotle signifi es its fi nal and perfect cause, for those who live a civil life do not just 
live – which beasts or slaves do – but live well, sc. having leisure for the liberal activities 
that result from the virtues both of the practical and of the theoretical soul (Marsilius 
of Padua, 2004, p. 18). 
As previously mentioned, for Marsilius, the city represented the space in which 
men can preserve themselves, and, even more important, have a worthy life.5 The city 
also represented the place where men can better display their virtues and exercise 
their civility (Viroli, 1994, p. 35). This was possible, according to Dolcini, by elaborat-
ing new political definitions from Aristotle and from the constitutional literature of 
the fourteenth century Italian communes (1995, p. 27). To Marsilius, concepts such 
as civitas, regnum and civilitas became synonymous. These terms also related, as 
again remarks Dolcini, with regnum, which means ‘any government ruled by laws’, 
but this notion loses its monarchical character as it is understood as government 
commune quidam ad omnem regiminis temperate speciem (Dolcini, 1995, p. 27). 
For de Lagarde, however, there is not a clear distinction between regnum 
and civitas. Both terms could mean ‘political regime’ or ‘the way to rule a polity’. 
When Marsilius wanted to provide a definition of political community, he borrowed 
John of Paris’s term civitas aut regnum (de Lagarde, 1967, p. 91). This word has 
four meanings: (i) cities under one government; (ii) a temperate monarchy (Strauss, 
1987, p. 279); (iii) a dominant city; (iv) a temperate government (de Lagarde, 1967, 
p. 92). In this manner, regnum does not design any particular political regime but is 
an abstract term which describes a multitude ordained for the common advantage 
(Bayona, 2009, p. 146).
Following Aristotle, Marsilius considered that the perfection of the city 
depends on its degree of diversification. He divided the city into six constitutive 
parts related to agriculture, the arts, finance, the military, the priesthood and the 
deliberative part (agricultura, artificium, militaris, pecunativa, sacerdocium, iudicialis 
seu consiliativa). The first three parts are considered essential for survival; the latter 
three are in charge of executive functions and the good exercise of government. For 
Marsilius, it was necessary that there be a harmonious interaction between these 
parts to have peace and to live well (de Largarde, 1967, p. 104). In other words, 
the city and its parts must be in the same relation of tranquility as ‘an animal with 
its parts’ in order to live well (Brett, 2004, p. xx). 
The possibility of living well is only achieved when the city lives in a civil com-
munity (civilis communitatis) ruled by laws. In this case, the individuals would solve 
their disputes without resorting to force. Marsilius recognized that men’s actions 
are usually governed by passions. Without the existence of institutions, men would 
be guided by their desires and personal interests. Without laws, the city would be 
ravaged by internal strife and separation. Otherwise, when men lived peacefully in a 
civil community, they would be able to devote themselves to their spiritual health.6 
The existence of a true civil community depends on having institutions that ensure 
peace (de Lagarde, 1967, p. 102). In this way, it is possible to advance another 
feature of the civilis communitatis: the rule before law. The reason appears to be 
5 ‘Sic itaque determinata civitate propter vivere et bene vivere’ (Marsiglio da Padova, 1991, p. 92).
6 For Marsilius, the perfect community meant the whole political body comprised of believers (Quillet, 2007, 
p. 535).
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practical. Unlike human beings, laws are not affected by affections or passions.7 
When a city is only ruled by laws, it is less likely to suffer from sedition and internal 
strife. Finally, it was the search for peace which forced men to gather and to form 
the state.
For Marsilius, when human beings lived in a state of nature, they were 
governed by the oldest members of their group. Those individuals legislated and 
punished criminals only by following the mandates of the law of nature.8 However, 
as the community grew bigger, these regulations were not enough. It was neces-
sary to create a better method to control human desires and passions. In fact, it 
is possible to say that passions constitute the most challenging obstacle to the 
survival of the city. But Marsilius did not put down the human vices; he seemed to 
recognize that human beings always have the tendency to act with excess naturally. 
For this reason, he proposed a political solution to control human vices.9 In Brett’s 
opinion, ‘the solution of excesses is the restoration of the situation of balance or 
equality that existed prior to the excess committed: equalization’ (Brett, 2004, 
p. xxi). Marsilius’s task was to establish a standard of what is equal and to determine 
who is the legislator or human law-maker (Brett, 2004, p. xxii). For Brett, Marsilius’s 
solution constituted the bedrock of his political philosophy. The universitas civium 
or the body of citizens is ‘the one person’ with the best characteristics to make laws 
(Brett, 2004, p. xxii).
Let us say, then, in accordance with both the truth and the counsel of Aristotle, Poli-
tics III chapter 6, that the ‘legislator’, i.e. the primary and proper effi cient cause of 
the law, is the people or the universal body of the citizens or else its prevailing part, 
when, by means of an election or will expressed in speech in a general assembly of 
the citizens, it commands or determines, subject to temporal penalty or punishment, 
that something should be done or omitted in respect of human civil acts (Marsilius 
of Padua, 2004, p. 66).
For Ullmann, the universitas civium was a corporation composed exclusively 
of citizens (1988, p. 397). It is considered a sort of human legislator with power 
similar to the Rex Francorum, Rex Anglorum. Ullmann argues that the universitas 
civium was not formed by an individual group or class, but by the totality of citizens 
(1988, p. 398). However, it is important to remark that even if Marsilius included in 
the universitas civium people who normally had been excluded from deliberative 
works, he also proposed a set of criteria to keep out the majority of population 
(Costa, 1993, p. 26). In Marsilius’s works, the universitas civium resembled the 
hierarchical societal order of medieval towns (Chevalier, 1993, p. 208) in which 
women, children, foreigners and serfs were not included in political life (Dolcini, 
1995, p. 29). In this way, universitas civium comprises only men who have the right 
to participate in political decisions of the community.10
7 ‘Neminem certe quantumcumque studiosum sic psse carere passione perversa et ignorancia, quemadmodum 
lex. Ideoque tucius est regulari iudicia civila lege, quam arbitrio iudicantis committi, quantumcumque eciam 
studiosi’(Marsiglio de Padova, 1991, p. 184).
8 ‘In hac enim oportuit seniorem disponere iusta et conferencia rationabili aliqua ordinatione vel lege quasi 
naturali…’ (Marsiglio de Padova, 1991, p. 88).
9 ‘Hoc autem sic primum videre est, quoniam secumdum legem principari ipsosum iudicia preservat a defectu, 
contingente propter ignoranciam at affectionem perversam. Unde in seipsis et ad cives subditos regulari, minus 
paciuntur sediciones et per consequens suorum principatuum soliciones, que illis contingerent agentitibus 
prave secundum suum arbitrium’ (Marsiglio de Padova, 1991, p. 182).
10 ‘Civem autem dico…eum qui participat in communitate civili, principat consiliativ vel iudicativo secumdum 
gradum suum. Per quam siquidem descripcionem separantur modus diversum’ (Marsiglio da Padova, 1991, 
p. 194).
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For Marsilius, the laws and prerogatives that govern the communitas are best 
discerned by the universitas civium, rather than a few citizens. On the other hand, 
when only a few citizens are in charge of making laws, they could have interests 
contrary to the common good and make laws that favor their particular interests 
(Brett, 2004, p. 69). Therefore, for Marsilius, the best way to maintain peace was to 
allow the community to decide on its best interests and the common good.
That this comes about in the best way solely through the universal body of the citizens 
or its prevailing part (which is moreover taken for the same thing), I show as follows: 
because that to which the whole of that body tends, in both understanding and 
inclination, enjoys a more certain judgment of its truth and a more careful attention 
to its common utility (Marsilius of Padua, 2004, p. 69).
In Marsilius’s opinion, when the legislative power is granted to a few citizens, 
it contradicts the principle of equality in which no citizen can be inferior to another 
(Viroli, 1994, p. 36). However, it is important not to forget that for Marsilius the 
institutions in charge of providing justice may not always be controlled by the uni-
versitas civium; thus, the institutions could be granted to one individual. To recog-
nize the community as the source of all legislative labour, Marsilius advanced one 
conclusion: The prerogatives which affect the well-being of all must be established 
by the universitas itself (Blythe, 2003, p. 64). As a result, the best laws, and certainly 
the most stable polity, would result when the community as a whole ‘evaluates the 
laws proposed by the wise and educated men’ (Blythe, 2003, p. 64).
Marsilius identified the universitas civium with the ‘prevailing part or valentior 
pars’ (Dolcini, 1995, p. 27). As Dolcini has noted, Marsilius created the concept of 
valentior pars based on Book VI of the Politics (1995, p. 30). Aristotle considered that 
the basis of a democratic republic is liberty. One principle of this liberty ‘is for all to rule 
and be ruled in turn’ (Aristotle, 1949, p. 1347b40–5), but democratic justice is ‘the 
application of numerical not proportionate equality; whence it follows that the major-
ity must be supreme’ (Aristotle, 1949, p. 1347b40–5). However, for Aristotle, the best 
constitution is not democratic, but is one controlled by a populous middle class.11 This 
is not the case in the Defensor pacis. For Marsilius, it was unacceptable that a few take 
decisions to impede the common good; thus, the laws are made by the whole com-
munity itself. For Marsilius, the valentior pars was not only quantitatively superior but 
also qualitatively superior to any individual (Brett, 2004, p. xxiii). As a result, Marsilius 
suggested that the valentior pars not only have a primordial role in instituting laws, but 
it must be in control of the political institutions (Dolcini, 1995, p. 31).
Leo Strauss believes that by ascribing the principal part of government to 
the universitas civium, Marsilius was more democratic than Aristotle (Strauss, 1987, 
p. 281). However, as Costa points out, Marsilius’s suggestion is still far from our 
modern concept of democracy. Universitas and valentior pars did not refer to citizens’ 
rights, but instead to the disposition of the political order and its parts within a whole 
(Costa, 1993, p. 26). This proposal, as Canning argues, copied the constitutional 
legislations of the republican communes of northern Italy (Canning, 2007, p. 364). 
In this context, citizens were no longer considered subjects (sub-ditus, Unter-tan), 
but a very important part of the state: the legislator humanus (Ullmann, 1988, 
p. 397), even if the potestas was conferred on only a few citizens (Canning, 2007, 
p. 365). Finally, Quentin Skinner has suggested that the constitutional model pro-
posed by Marsilius had a practical interest in mind: to secure their liberty by putting 
11 ‘That the middle is best is evident, for it is the freest from faction: where the middle class is numerous, there 
least occur factions and divisions among citizens’ (Aristotle, 1949, p. 1296a7-9).
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the weight of government on the citizens themselves (Skinner, 2010, p. 60-61). 
Therefore, the purpose of recognizing the valentior pars as the legislator humanus 
was to avert threats against the common good (de Lagarde, 1967, p. 106). 
For Marsilius, the valentior pars had to be involved in the creation of new 
laws by approving them because it was the only ‘person’ capable of perceiving the 
best interests of the city.12 For Skinner, the body of citizens had a very active role in 
the Defensor pacis; they also elected their magistrates and removed them in case 
of necessity (Skinner, 2010, p. 64). This active involvement resulted in the creation 
of constitutional procedures which guarantee the interaction between citizens and 
their governors. Viroli agrees with Skinner by suggesting that the engagement of 
citizens in legislative functions became the foundation of the vivere politico in the 
Defensor pacis (Viroli, 1994, p. 35). For Marsilius, politics was the art of establish-
ing laws that guarantee the common good. As a result, Marsilius linked the art of 
politics with the art of legislation (Viroli, 1994, p. 35).
[…] as we read in Politics III chapter 4, any and every citizen should be free and not 
suffer the despotism (i.e. the servile dominion) of another. But this would not be the 
case if someone or few of the citizens passed law upon the universal body of the 
citizens on their own authority, for in legislating in this way they would be despots 
over the others. And therefore the rest of the citizens (viz. the more extensive part) 
would either take this law badly – however good it was – or not accept it at all: as 
the victims of contempt, they would protest against it; and since they had not been 
involved in its passage they would not observe it at all. But every citizen would happily 
obey and accept a law passed as a result of an audience or consent on the part of all 
the multitude, even if it were less useful; in that with a law of this kind, each can be 
seen to have laid it upon himself, and therefore has no cause to protest against it, but 
rather to accept it with equanimity (Marsilius of Padua, 1994, p. 70).
In Marsilius’s claim, there were two methods to establish laws in the city: (i) 
by delegating this task to wise individuals; (ii) by designating a general assembly. In 
both cases, the citizens have an active role in the election of their assembly delegates 
and officers.13 In Skinner’s interpretation, the elective character of electing offices 
in the Defensor pacis ensured that only the best men (pars principans) are chosen 
to hold office (Skinner, 2010, p. 63). The problem was how to make sure that the 
actions taken by the ruler were kept fully under the control of the body of citizens. 
The answer was in the creation of constraints that were directly imposed on rulers. 
These constrains prevented the rulers from ignoring the will of the citizens (Skinner, 
2010, p. 63). In this way, by instituting a number of restrictions and obligations on 
elected officials by the body of citizens, Marsilius believed that the elected princes 
would be forced to care for the common good.
Again, the new election of the future monarch renders the present monarch more 
careful in respect of the common civil guardianship of persons and goods; fi rstly be-
cause of his virtue, since we suppose this from the fact of his election; next, through 
fear of arraignment by the future monarch; and again, so that he can himself merit 
the future election of his successors (Marsilius of Padua, 1994, p. 104).
12 ‘Et quoniam sic late per auditum et consensum universo multitudinis melius observabuntur, nec adversus 
eas habebit aliquis reclamare’ (Marsiglio da Padova, 1991, p. 222).
13 ‘Et propterea iusturum et conferencium civilium et incommodorum seu onerum communium et similium 
reliquorum regulas, futuras leges siva statuta, querendas seu inveniendas et examinandas prudentibus et 
expertis per universitatem civium comitii conveniens et perutile est; sic ut vel seorsum ab unaquaque primarium 
parcium civitatis… secumdum tamen uniuscuiusque proporcionem, eligantur aliqui, vel ab omnibus simul 
congragatis civitus omnes eligantur experti seu prudentes viri predicti’ (Marsiglio da Padova, 1991, p. 220).
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Arguably, Strauss considers that the democratic character of the Defensor 
pacis was a product of Marsilius’s profound anticlericalism. In his fight against the 
ecclesiastical authorities, Marsilius needed to ground his political theory in some-
thing other than theological sources (Strauss, 1987, p. 281), which led him to place 
the power of legislation in the multitudes. In this way, he could deny the plenitude 
claims of John XXII and his officials (Strauss, 1987, p. 284). Strauss casts doubt on the 
populist vocation of Marsilius. According to the German scholar, Marsilius favored a 
regime close to ‘an aristocracy which is acceptable to the populace’ (1987, p. 287). 
However, even if Marsilius did not explicitly suggest a politically active citizenship; 
he was also granting the body of citizens with an inherent wisdom to understand 
their own needs (Blythe, 2003, p. 65). Therefore, there is a tacit admission in Mar-
silius that the government has its source in the body of citizens.
The democratic orientation of the defensor 
pacis
It is important to mention the characteristics of elected officials and princes 
in the Defensor pacis. The prince for Marsilius acts as ‘an equalizer or regulator to 
bring actions into line’ (Brett, 2004, p. xxvi). He acts as an executer in the civil order, 
but he does not decide the form of government without the legislator. In other 
words, the ruler only executes the laws that the legislator has made. In Marsilius’s 
scheme, the princes could make some laws but only in conformity with the will of 
the body of citizens. In this sense, the princes are restrained by the laws created by 
the community (Brett, 2004, p. xxvi).  
Following Book III of Aristotle's Politics, Marsilius identified monarchy, aristocracy 
and polity as the three well-tempered regimes and tyranny, oligarchy and democracy 
as the three bad forms of governments. While the good regimes make rules for the 
common good, in the distorted governments the prince acts as a legislator and an 
executioner of the laws (Brett, 2004, p. xxv). Thus, the bad rules deprive the body of 
citizens of their principal role, the legislative part, and they strip the body of citizens of 
the possibility of electing their prince (Brett, 2004, p. xxvii). Marsilius did not make any 
effort  ‘to speculate, however, about which may be the best of the tempered forms of 
principate, or which the worst of the flawed, and the relative ranking of the rest in terms 
of goodness or badness, is not our present concern’ (Marsilius of Padua, 2004, p. 42).
For Marsilius, the distorted forms of government are often obtained by fraud 
or force. However, he recognized two forms of government contrary to the common 
benefit but instituted by the rule of law. One is the monarchy instituted by hereditary 
succession. This type of regime is held by some monarchs in Asia where the laws 
are quasi-despotic by favoring the advantage of the monarch against the common 
good of the majority.14 Another is the elective monarchy in which laws favor only 
the prince’s own good, but not the common good. The only difference between 
these regimes is that in the elective monarchy some members of the valentior pars 
have the right to participate in the election of their prince.  
Marsilius refers to the prince and the subjects as the primary elements of the 
civil order. Both the prince and the subjects come together to establish ways to bet-
ter exercise their functions. Princes have the authority to command multitudes, but 
14 ‘Alius autem modus est, quo quidam monarche in Asia principantur…secundum legem tamen, ad monarche 
conferens magis quam ad commune simpliciter, quasi despoticam. Sustinent enim habitatores illius regionis 
talem principatum nihil contristati, propter ipsorum barbaram et servile naturam et consuetudinis auxilium’ 
(Marsiglio da Padova, 1991, p. 146, 148).
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they must understand that they can do this only with the consent of the multitude. 
This is more likely to happen when the prince is voluntarily instituted by the body 
of citizens (Brett, 2004, p. xxvi). 
Marsilius reckoned that one of the principal advantages of democratic prince-
doms is that it is relatively more frequent to elect virtuous princes by a politically 
active body of citizens. Marsilius preferred elective governments because these 
regimes express the will of the body of citizens better. In these political regimes, 
the rulers are forced to keep the ‘prevailing part’ happy and are also prevented 
from acting tyrannically.15 In conclusion, the democratic princedoms were the best 
form of polity for Marsilius because the arrangements made in these regimes are 
normally more politically oriented to the common good.
Whereas succession by birth, which is for the most part by chance, cannot produce 
such a monarch with the same certainty. As it is evident from individual kingdoms 
that adopt their monarch in this way. Further: because every good quality that is ab-
solutely required in a monarch, and which succession by birth or lineage gives, will 
almost always be produced by a new election, whereas the converse is not true. For it 
is open to a civil multitude to adopt the heir and successor of the previous monarch 
through election, if he is virtuous and prudent. But if he does not have this character, 
a fresh election will yield someone else who is virtuous and prudent: when hereditary 
succession could not produce such a man (Marsilius of Padua, 2004, p. 104).
In Viroli’s contention, this notion of politics was embedded in Roman civil 
wisdom. In this sense, Viroli suggests that Marsilius’s citizenry must possess some 
virtue as a whole (Viroli, 1994, p. 36), but this proposition is never clearly expressed 
in the Defensor pacis. 
Individual liberty and political participation
When Marsilius examined the conditions in which liberty is best safeguarded, 
he expressed that it is only possible when peace and concord prevail in the city. For 
Marsilius and other writers such as Remigio Romano, the chief danger to peace is 
the prevalence of factions and discord among citizens. When discord prevails within 
the body of citizens, the people neglect the common good, and injuries are not 
avenged or judged. The result is fighting and separation and, finally, the destruction 
of the state (Skinner, 2010, p. 57-58). The best method to tackle conflict is to set 
the sectional interests aside, ‘and the good of each individual citizen equates with 
the good of the city as a whole’ (Skinner, 2010, p. 58). In this way, the common 
good is attained and aimed at all times16 and liberty is guaranteed. 
Arguably Costa could advance one definition of liberty in the Defensor pacis: 
the space in which a city can affirm and develop its cultural identity. Liberty, then, is 
the ability of members of a community, as a corporation, to determine themselves by 
their own laws (Costa, 1993, p. 30), even if the personal degree of freedom depends 
in many cases on the person’s status within the hierarchical order of society (Costa, 
1993, p. 29). More generally speaking, liberty is defined as the capacity of the body 
15 ‘Participat autem quilibet dictorum modorum tanto amplius de vero regali, quanto magis est ad subditos 
voluntarios et secumdum legem latam ad comune conferens subditorum; tanto vero amplius tyrampnidem 
sapiens, quanto magis exit ab hiis, consensu videlicet subditorum et lege ad ipsorum commune conferens 
instituta’ (Marsiglio da Padova, 1991, p. 150, 152).
16 ‘Ab electione namque legislatoris humani quasi semper, raro deficiens, intenditur et perfecitur commune 
conferens civim’ (Marsiglio da Padova, 1991, p. 270).
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of citizens to participate in the public affairs of the city.17 However, Blythe criticizes 
this suggestion. For Blythe, nothing in the Defensor pacis implies an active citizen-
ship in a determinate political regime. What lies in Marsilius’s most famous text was 
a consciousness of the participation in the legislative part of government for the 
common benefit. This makes the community live well, free of conflicts. For Marsilius 
all political constitutions might be acceptable and good if they are approved by the 
human legislator or the valentior pars (Blythe, 2003, p. 65). However, it is possible 
that this prevailing part, after creating the laws, may not get involved in the affairs 
of the polity.
One of the most important points in Marsilius’s thought is that liberty is not 
grounded by an ontological value, but it is grounded by the active participation of 
the people in the legislative work (Dolcini, 1995, p. 37). According to Brett, Mar-
silius did not make any effort to define freedom conceptually, he just related the 
freedom of the communities with the personal liberty of the individuals within these 
communities. Then for Brett, the value of liberty for Marsilius appears to be only 
practical because only free individuals can aspire to live well (Brett, 2004, p. xiv). 
In effect, there are not clear definitions of the concept of personal liberty in 
the Defensor pacis, but it would be erroneous to extrapolate our modern concept 
of liberty as non-interference with Marsilius of Padua. In this way, it is necessary to 
remember that for medieval scholarship, the existence of civic life is what determines 
the presence of spaces of non-interference by which citizens can freely set their laws 
and institutions (Costa, 1993, p. 31). As Costa points out, for Marsilius, the capacity 
of the community to set laws up freely may implicitly guarantee the general good 
of each of its members (Costa, 1993, p. 32). Costa’s contention is also supported 
by Quentin Skinner. In Skinner’s claim, the link of personal liberty with that of the 
community is proof of Marsilius’s republican orientation (Skinner, 2010, p. 57-58). In 
this sense, the highest authority becomes the community because it has the power 
to elect its rulers and to create its own laws. The source and the efficient cause of 
the political power is, thus, the citizen-body.18 
For Marsilius, the participation of the ‘prevailing part’, whether limited or not, 
is more important than the role played by the prince (de Lagarde, 1967, p. 113). 
The reason is that peace and unity are secured only when the valentior pars is in 
charge of legislation (Dolcini, 1995, p. 37). Laws and government get their approval 
from the body of citizens and not from the spiritual power. Therefore, when the 
body of citizens became the source for legitimizing political power, the role of the 
ecclesiastical authorities would be limited only to spiritual matters. In this way, the 
state would avoid the existence of political strife.
It remains now to show that all those in the position of prince should exercise their func-
tion in accordance with the law, not beyond it, and especially monarchs who exercise 
this function together with all their posterity, so that their principates may be more 
secure and long–lasting. We can see that this is so in the fi rst place because to exercise 
the function of prince according to the laws saves their judgments from defects arising 
from ignorance and perverted inclination. As a result, being regulated both in themselves 
17 ‘Amplius ad principale sic: quoniam illud agibile, in cuius debita institucione consisitit maxima pars communis 
sufficiency civium in hac vita, et in cuius prava institucione commune detrimentum immitet, per universitatem 
civium tantummodo debet institui; hoc autem est lex; ergo ad universitatem civium tauntummodo illius pertinent 
institucio’ (Marsiglio da Padova, 1991, p. 200).
18 ‘Quod quidem igitur legumlacionis seu institucionis auctoritas, et de ipsarum observacione coactivum dare 
preceptum, ad solam civium universitatem seu ipsius valenciorem partem, tranquam efficientem causam, 
pertiteat, aut ad illum vel illos, cui vel quibus auctoritatem hanc concesserit iam dicta universitas, sufficienter 
ex dictis demonstrasse putamus’ (Marsiglio da Padova, 1991, p. 222, 224).
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and towards the citizens who are their subjects, they suffer fewer acts of sedition (and 
consequent dissolution of their principate) than they would encounter if they acted 
badly in accordance with their own discretion (Marsilius of Padua, 2004, p. 62).
Finally, the Defensor pacis integrated the image of the political man of Politics 
and Nicomachean Ethics to Ciceronian language. The assimilation of Aristotle is also 
observable in the works of Dante and Bruneto Latini. In the fourteenth century, as 
has been expressed by Viroli, Aristotelian language gave a new application to the 
word politicus. It described a state in which the ruler obeys the laws and does not 
regard the commonwealth as a private possession (Viroli, 1994, p. 36). In agreement 
with Viroli, the spread of Aristotelianism reinforced the view of politics as the art of 
preserving a community, living under a rule of law in which the source of political 
power did not have a divine origin (Viroli, 1994, p. 36).
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